When HP purchased Palm for $1.2 billion, I had hope – as did many – that they would push the boundaries of webOS and grow it to scale. Of course, that didn’t happen.
The decision to open source webOS is better than just killing it, I suppose. But it still doesn’t solve the two fundamental problems that plagued webOS since its inception at Palm and prevented the fantastic operating system from achieving success. Those two problems are 1) poor & uninspiring hardware, and 2) failure to nurture and grow a thriving app economy.
Of course, HP introduced a third problem shortly after the purchase. That problem was massive, productivity-sapping bureaucracy, and it ultimately proved more cancerous than the first two.
I’m not the only one who had high hopes for the resurgence of Palm/HP. Many tech writers and enthusiasts wrote about the possibilities of this purchase. It’s always tough to see a bright future for a company while its team fails to execute. It’s even tougher to witness well-crafted work like webOS get mismanaged into obscurity.
For me, the catalyst for all this hope and potential was the idea of another vertically stacked company integrating a seamless marriage between hardware and software. Apple has proven that good software needs good hardware – and both need to be built by the same company in order to achieve prime simplicity for the user. HP knew this to be the right path. With this strategy, they could have presented a challenger to Apple. They could have been a worthy opponent to iPhone & iPad dominance.
The idea is seductive. Yet like most “what if’s”, it was ultimately too good to be true. Perhaps if HP had kept Mark Hurd on as CEO they may have had a shot. He had problems, but it seemed like he saw the light in building out webOS to its fullest potential.
For Apple, they sit alone and unchallenged as the kings of perfect integration. For HP, they’ve lost their opportunity. Perhaps if things went differently – much differently – they could have been the next Apple.
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